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SCHOOL VOUCHERS:
THE EDUCATIONAL SILVER BULLET,
OR AN IDEOLOGICAL BLANK ROUND?
Gary D. Allison*
If the fact alone be determinative that religious schools are engaged in
education, thus promoting the general and individual welfare,.., then I can
see no possible basis... for the state's refusal to make full appropriation for
support of private, religious schools, just as is done for public instruction.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the last day of its 2001 Term, the United States Supreme Court released
one of its most anticipated decisions in the school voucher case of Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.2 The Court's five conservatives joined in a majority opinion to
hold that Ohio's Pilot Scholarship Program ("Voucher Program")3 does not
offend the Establishment Clause.4 They reached this result by dramatically
altering the scope of an Establishment Clause neutrality test conservative Justices
5have aggressively developed and expanded over the last twenty years.
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. LL.M., Columbia University School
of Law (1976); J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law (1972); B.S., University of Tulsa (1968). The
author wishes to thank Jake Woodard, his research assistant of last spring, who contributed greatly to
the author's creation of background analyses of the United States Supreme Court's key church-state
decisions.
1. Taken from Justice Rutledge's prescient dissent in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
Township, 330 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1947), wherein he decried the Supreme Court's refusal to find that the
Township of Ewing's practice of reimbursing parents for the cost of transporting their children to
public or Catholic schools violated the Establishment Clause.
2. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
3. Ohio's current Pilot Scholarship Program is authorized by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.974-
3313.979 (West 2002).
4. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2462-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas,
JJ., majority opinion). The Establishment Clause states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ..." U.S. Const. amend. I.
5. The neutrality test altered by the Zelman majority is a religiously-neutral-beneficiary-selection-
criteria/private-choice framework crafted by conservative Justices in three major cases involving
government aid programs that helped individuals pursue education in private schools run by religious
organizations. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3-14 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
joined by White, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., majority opinion); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490-93 (1986) (White, J., concurring; Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., &
Rehnquist, J., concurring; O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-404 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., White, Powell & O'Connor,
JJ., majority opinion). Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467-71 (majority's application of the neutrality test to
Ohio's Voucher Program).
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The conservative Justices were compelled to alter the scope of their
neutrality test because, as will be documented in Part II of this article, Ohio's
Voucher Program was designed so that it was inevitable that the vast majority of
voucher recipients (all of whom live within the boundaries of the Cleveland
School District, and most of whom are from low-income families) would use their
vouchers to attend religious private schools.6  Obviously, then, the Zelman
decision cannot be assessed adequately without a good understanding of the Ohio
Voucher Program's design and the major factors that influenced it. Accordingly,
Part II of this article also contains a detailed description of the Ohio Voucher
Program and a brief discussion of the circumstances out of which it arose.
It is also impossible to assess Zelman without a good understanding of how
the conservatives' neutrality test was created and applied prior to Zelman, and
how the Zelman majority altered it. So, Part III of this article supplies an
exposition of how the Court's conservatives developed their neutrality test. Using
the pre-Zelman neutrality test as a template, Part IV documents how the Zelman
majority altered it so that it not only envelops the unique facts of Ohio's Voucher
Program, but also practically insures that every conceivable federal government
voucher program, including those associated with faith-based initiatives, will be
immune from Establishment Clause attack.
Given that the primary beneficiaries of Ohio's Voucher Program are
minority students from low-income families who would otherwise attend
Cleveland's allegedly poor performing public schools,7 it is not surprising that
Zelman has been hailed by some as a great victory for securing equal educational
opportunities for minority students on par with the great desegregation victory of
Brown v. Board of Education. Equal educational opportunity is not the concern
6. As stated by the Court:
The program has been in operation within the Cleveland City School District since the 1996-
1997 school year. In the 1999-2000 school year, 56 private schools participated in the
program, 46 (or 82%) of which had a religious affiliation.... More than 3,700 students
participated . . ., most of whom (96%) enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent
of these students were from families at or below the poverty line.
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
7. Id.
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the
intentional segregation of public schools was unconstitutional through the following famous passage:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 495. Proponents of school vouchers enthusiastically praised Zelman as a victory for educational
equality on par with Brown. For example, on July 1, 2002, President Bush praised the Zelman decision
in a speech delivered in Cleveland by stating that:
the Supreme Court in 1954 declared that our nation cannot have two education systems.
And that was the right decision. Can't have two systems, one for African Americans and
one for whites. Last week, what's notable and important is that the Court declared that our
nation will not accept one education system for those who can afford to send their children
to a school of their choice and for those who can't. [sic] And that's just as historic.
[Vol. 38:329
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of the Establishment Clause, but, as demonstrated in Part V of this article, the
hard lot of minority students in Cleveland supplied leverage and collateral
justification for the majority's results-oriented alteration of the conservatives'
Establishment Clause neutrality test. Hard facts often provide the impetus for
changing the law, but bad law can also create hard facts. Part VI of this article
presents an argument that conservative forces on courts and in legislatures
produced the desperate academic conditions in urban schools that induced some
minority community leaders to join with, conservatives in demanding the creation
of school voucher programs.
II. OHIO'S VOUCHER PROGRAM: ITS ORIGINS & DESIGN
On March 3, 1995, the federal district court handling a desegregation case
against the Cleveland School District ordered the State of Ohio to assume
operational control over the Cleveland Public Schools. 9 The takeover was
triggered because the Cleveland School District was in an extreme financial crisis
that threatened its ability to finance its share of the costs of implementing an
education reform program known as Vision 21. ° Two malign forces caused the
financial crisis that triggered the takeover:
(1) Ohio's system of funding public education, which underfunded education
generally, and produced great disparities of education funding among
school districts because of its heavy reliance on local property taxes;1 and
President George W. Bush, Speech, President Lauds Supreme Court School Choice Decision
(Cleveland, Ohio, July 1, 2002) (available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/
20020701-7.html>) (accessed July 20, 2002).
9. On March 3, 1995, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ordered
the Ohio State Superintendent of Public Instruction to take over the operation of the Cleveland Public
School District in order to prevent a fiscal crisis from interrupting the implementation of the Court's
Desegregation Remedial Orders and accompanying consent decree of May 25, 1994. Or. Sua Sponte of
J. Krupansky, in Reed v. Rhodes, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 1995). (Note, the
LEXIS document falsely indicates that this order is published at 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, which is the cite of a
1998 decision that relieved the Cleveland School District from federal court desegregation orders)
("Takeover Order").
10. The immediate cause of the financial crisis was a projected budgetary shortfall of $29.5 million
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1995, Finding No. 2, id. at **2-3, and the refusal of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction to support the Cleveland School District's attempts to secure a
loan in that amount because the District's Board had failed to account for forty million dollars
advanced to it by the state for 1994-95, failed to account for forty million in matching funds it was to
provide in compliance with the Desegregation Compliance Plan and Consent Decree of May 25, 1994,
and refused to approve an acceptable Compliance Management Plan. Finding No. 3, id. at *4.
Moreover, the District had the highest debt-to-revenue ratio among comparable Ohio school districts,
Finding No. 5, id., and it projected an increasing indebtedness of $147,478,000 by June 30, 1996.
Finding No. 6, id.
11. On December 19, 1991, numerous plaintiffs filed suit against the State of Ohio, asserting that
Ohio's methods of funding public education violated numerous provisions of Ohio's Constitution.
DeRolph v. St., 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) ("DeRolph I"). After a thirty day trial that commenced on
October 25, 1993, the trial judge held that Ohio's public school financing scheme violated several Ohio
constitutional provisions, including: requirements that Ohio provide "equal protection and benefit" to
its citizens, Ohio Const. art. I, § 2, "encourage schools and the means of instruction," id. art. I, § 7,
ensure that all general laws "have a uniform operation," id. art. II, § 26, "make such provision[]...
as ... will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State," id. art. VI,
§ 2, "[p]rovi[de] ... for the organization, administration and control of the public school system of the
state supported by public funds," id. art. VI, § 3, and "provide for raising revenue ... sufficient to
3
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(2) The unwillingness or inability of Cleveland taxpayers to impose a high
enough levy on their taxable property in order to fund the Cleveland
Public Schools properly.
1 2
defray the expenses of the state.., for each year." Id. art. XII, § 4. DeRolph v. St., 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3915 at *27 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Aug. 30, 1995). To cure these violations, the trial judge
entered an order that would have essentially required the state legislature to take steps to increase the
state's funding of education and to eliminate "wealth-based disparities [among school districts]." Id. at
**20-22. On August 30, 1995, just two months after Ohio's Voucher Program was signed into law, the
trial court's decision was overturned by the Ohio Appeals Court for the Fifth District mostly on
grounds that the constitutionality of Ohio's system of funding primary and secondary education had
been settled in a prior case. Id. at **6-22.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding instead that Ohio's system of
financing public schools violated Ohio's constitutional duty to provide a thorough and efficient system
of common schools throughout the state. DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 747. In 2000, the Ohio Supreme
Court found the General Assembly's response to DeRolph I to be deficient. DeRolph v. St., 728
N.E.2d 993, 1020-22 (2000) ("DeRolph II"). About sixteen months later, the court generally praised
the general assembly's efforts to comply with DeRolph II, DeRolph v. St., 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1199-1200
(2001) ("DeRolph III"), which included:
" A new base cost formula for calculating state aid based on the average costs per pupil
of highly successful school districts that promised to generate more money for
education, DeRolph I11, 754 N.E.2d at 1191-92;
" Gap aid to provide more money to districts with tax bases inadequate to fund fully their
local share of the base cost ($.023 x property valuation), id. at 1192-93;
" Parity aid to provide districts ranked below the eightieth percentile in taxable property
wealth with funding above its base cost share, with such aid to be calculated as the
difference between what such districts can raise on 9.5 mills and what 9.5 mills will
produce in the eightieth percentile district, id.; and
" New mechanisms for state financing of facilities construction, renovation, and
maintenance that reflected a substantial increase in the state's commitment to assuring
that all educational facilities were safe and adequate, id. at 1193-96.
Nevertheless, the court still found several technical deficiencies in the state's modified public
school financing scheme that kept it from being fully constitutional. Id. at 1199-1201. Then, about two
months later, in response to a motion to reconsider its order in DeRolph III, the court ordered all the
parties into mediation before finally determining whether to overturn or modify its DeRolph III
decision. DeRolph v. St., 93 Ohio St. 3d 628, 629-31 (2001). As of August 6, 2002, Ohio's Supreme
Court had yet to rule finally on the motion to reconsider and Ohio's General Assembly still had not
come up with a fully constitutional system of financing Ohio's public schools. See Staff Reports,
Justices in 'State of Flux' over School-Funding Fix, The Columbus Dispatch 7B (Aug. 6, 2002)
(available in LEXIS, News Library, COLDIS).
12. Ohio's great reliance on property taxes to provide funding for public schools presented
Cleveland with a large problem in convincing voters to approve the levies necessary to finance its
Vision 21 matching funds. Cleveland's low property values and its residents' low average income
meant that Cleveland had an inadequate capacity for raising property tax levies. Scott Stephens, 13.5
Mills Leaves Some Wary; What If Tax Hike Doesn't Make Schools Better, Some in Cleveland Ask, The
Plain Dealer IA (Nov. 3, 1996) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD). This was because
Cleveland's low property values required the District to seek "higher tax millage to match revenue in
other districts," but its residents' low average income limited their capacity and willingness to pay
higher taxes. Id. This problem was further exacerbated by Cleveland's falling school property taxes,
which "dropped 7 percent in Cleveland" between 1990 and 1995, a time in which "school property
taxes rose 34 percent statewide." Cleveland School District Discouraged, The Plain Dealer 2B (Jan. 8,
1996) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD). As a consequence, as of fall 1996, local property
taxes supplied only 32.4% of the Cleveland Public Schools revenue, which was "well below the state
average of 50.4% .... " See Stephens, supra.
The Cleveland School District's ability to raise property taxes was further hindered by
demographics and racial divisions. "Only about 17% of Cleveland households ha[d] children...
attend[ing] city schools." See Patrice M. Jones & Evelyn Theiss, Schools' Next Battle Is at the Ballot
Box, The Plain Dealer 1A (Feb. 26, 1994) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD). Not only do
such "people feel they have done their share," but they may also be "older voters on a fixed income...
[for whom tax increases are] ... a financial hardship." Evelyn Theiss, Levy Campaign Gets Failing
Grades; Cleveland School Officials Ignored Some Political Truths, Observers Say, The Plain Dealer 1B
4
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It was important that Vision 21 be implemented successfully because it was
designed to eliminate the educational vestiges of segregation within the Cleveland
Public Schools so that a twenty-two year old desegregation controversy could
come to an end. 3 The key elements of Vision 21 included:
(May 8, 1994) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD) (comments of James Kweder, Associate
Professor of Political Science at Cleveland State University). Worse yet, there was a bitter racial divide
in Cleveland's electorate that traditionally pitted white voters predominantly located on Cleveland's
west side against African-American voters predominantly located on Cleveland's east side. See id.
Cleveland's west side white voters traditionally rejected school levies overwhelmingly, and this
tendency seemed to get worse as they began to send their children to parochial private schools at a
time when the Cleveland School District student population was becoming seventy percent African-
American. Id.
All these factors combined to help cause the defeat of two Cleveland School District levies
designed to head off financial crisis and provide the funds necessary to meet the District's Vision 21
matching funds obligations. On May 3, 1994, Cleveland voters defeated a 12.9 mill levy. Id. Six
months later, on November 8, 1994, Cleveland voters turned down a 9 mill levy. See Scott Stephens &
Patrice M. Jones, Board Ponders Defeat, Looks to Next Levy Try, The Plain Dealer 1A (Nov. 10, 1994)
(available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD).
As a practical matter, Cleveland's low property tax revenues meant that funding for its public
schools was limited to that provided by the state's foundation formula. This is because the state's
foundation formula insured that each district would receive at minimum a foundation per pupil funding
amount by providing state funds to any district for which the foundation amount exceeded what could
be generated by levying twenty mills on local property subject to property taxes. DeRolph v. St., 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 3915 at **4-5, 11, 13 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. 1995). Cleveland's low property tax
revenue meant it would receive only the foundation amount, a revenue stream consistently attacked by
Ohio's State Board of Education as too little to finance an adequate education program. Id. at *5.
Moreover, as an urban school district, Cleveland faced higher education costs than non-urban districts,
because it had to educate a higher percent of low-income and special education students. Tim Doulin,
Urban Kids Have Greater Needs; It Costs More to Educate Them, Group Says, The Columbus Dispatch
1B (June 21, 1996) (available in LEXIS, News Library, COLDIS). Although "[t]he state ... g[ave]...
extra ... money... for special-ed and low-income kids .... it [wa]s all a straight formula. There [wa]s
no analysis to consider, 'Is this enough?"' Id.
13. A federal lawsuit charging the Cleveland Public Schools with deliberately operating a
segregated school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
was filed on December 12, 1973. See Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (N.D. Ohio 1998). On
August 31, 1976, federal district Judge Battisti found that the Cleveland Public schools were highly
segregated in that as of 1975 88.21 percent of all students attended schools that were essentially one-
race schools and 91.75 percent of Cleveland's African-American students attended one-race schools.
Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("Reed I"). Judge Battisti further found that
this segregation had resulted from "the Cleveland Board of Education ... violat[ing] the... [Equal
Protection Clause] by intentionally creating and maintaining a segregated school system." Reed v.
Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976), remanded for reconsideration in light of Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977), affd on remand, 455 F. Supp.
546, 550 (N.D. Ohio 1978), affd as to liability of Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 714, 717, 722-37 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445 U.S. 935 (1980). Finally, Judge
Battisti held that Ohio's State Board of Education had contributed to the fostering of the Cleveland
Public Schools' unconstitutional segregation in part because it "chose not to actively pursue the goal of
integration, but rather... s[at] back and let the problem come to them ..... Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F.
Supp. 708, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976), remanded for reconsideration in light of Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997), affd on remand, 455 F. Supp. 546, 550
(N.D. Ohio 1978), remanded for reconsideration in light of Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d
787 (6th Cir. 1978) as to the liability of Ohio St. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1979), affd on
remand, 500 F. Supp. 404, 424-26 (N.D. Ohio 1980), affd, 662 F.2d 1219, 1227-28 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, sub nom. Ohio St. Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982). The defendants' recalcitrance
caused great delay in the implementation of the district court's remedial orders so that it was not until
1994 that any great progress was made to implement programs intended to remove the educational
vestiges of past discrimination. Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 1274, 1276-78, 1283-84 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
In 1994, the federal district court relaxed somewhat its racial balancing orders so that an education
reform program known as Vision 21 could be implemented as the means of eliminating the education
vestiges of segregation within the Cleveland School District. Id. at 1277, 1283-84; Reed v. Rhodes
5
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(1) Establishing Middle Schools by altering the intermediate school structure
from grades seven and eight to the middle school structure of grades six
through eight and financing 175 new teachers in order to reduce the middle
school staffing ratio to 19:1;
14
(2) Expanding the Magnet School Program by "implement[ing] nine magnet
themes at fifteen schools" and "enlarg[ing magnet school] ... capacity...
from 6,800 seats in 1992-93 to approximately 12,800 seats by the 1994-95
school year";
15
(3) Creating Community Model Schools by converting "all non-magnet
elementary schools ... [into] ... schools that... incorporate one of several
nationally recognized, research-based models of elementary school
instruction... [, providing] full-day kindergarten programs... [, and] ...
hir[ing] additional teachers,... pyschologists, social workers and other
specialists to implement these programs" ;16
(4) Initiating Comprehensive New Reading Programs by "implement[ing] ...
nationally-recognized reading programs for first graders... [and] one-on-
one tutoring for each child"; 7
(5) Preparing Children Do Well In First Grade Reading Programs by
implementing "developmentally appropriate preschool programs" for
every "four-year-old child[ ] ... scheduled to enter kindergarten...." and
"developmentally appropriate full-day kindergartens.' 18
The state was to provide twenty million dollars to fund Vision 21, plus additional
funding of up to $275 million, payable in varying annual amounts not to exceed
sixty million dollars in any one year, contingent upon the Cleveland School
District providing a matching $275 million by getting Cleveland to approve the
necessary levies. 9
As the state took over operation of the Cleveland Public Schools, it was
obvious to interested observers that system-wide reform of the Cleveland Public
Schools would not soon significantly improve the prospects of Cleveland children
receiving good public educations. The twenty-plus year desegregation conflict had
combined with management and financial crises to make the Cleveland School
District poorer, less integrated, and one of Ohio's worst performing school
systems.2° These problems thwarted the implementation of Vision 21.21 The state
Educ. Settlement Agreement § 6.1-2, in Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp 1265, 1269-70 (N.D. Ohio 1994)
("Settlement Agreement").
14. Settlement Agreement, App. B: Vision 21 Programs Supported by State Matching Funds, p. 1.,
in App. C of Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533, 1575-76 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (Matching Funds).
15. Id. pt. 2, at 1576.
16. Id. pt. 3, at 1576.
17. Id. at 1577.
18. Cleveland Sch. Dist., Settlement Agreement, App. A: The Cleveland School District's
Executive Summary of Vision 21, pt. B.2., in App. C of Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. at 1570.
19. Settlement Agreement, §§ 7, 8, supra n. 13, at 1270.
20. Cleveland experienced a substantial loss of middle class and upper class families from the 1970s
until the Spring of 1995, see Andrew Benson, Rich or Poor; Family Income Is Prime Predictor of How
Well a Student Will Perform in School, The Plain Dealer 1C (Oct. 8, 1995) (available in LEXIS, News
Library, CLEVPD), and eight of ten students were eligible for free and reduced lunches. Id. This
[Vol. 38:329
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was not interested in making substantial new investments in the Cleveland Public
Schools.22 Moreover, the court-ordered state takeover of the Cleveland Public
Schools had stripped Cleveland residents of local control over the public schools
that served Cleveland children.23
Further adding to the plight of students living in the Cleveland School
District was the failure of an Ohio public school choice law to serve them.
Enacted in 1993,4 this law established a limited right of students to transfer from
their native district to an adjacent district without paying tuition.2 1 "The idea was
to give some students a chance to attend another, perhaps better, school
system... [in the belief that i]f students and parents had a choice,... school
districts [would be forced] to compete. ''26 Unfortunately, this choice program was
unavailable to students if the adjacent district to which they wanted to transfer did
not "adopt[ ] a resolution... permit[ing] enrollment of students from all adjacent
compares with a poverty rate of about fifty percent among only the predominantly African-American
schools in 1973. Id.
By the Spring, 1995, "[t]he Cleveland [Public] Schools [we]re about 70 percent black." See The
Cleveland Schools Crisis, The Plain Dealer 4B (March 9, 1995) (available in LEXIS, News Library,
CLEVPD) [hereinafter Cleveland Crisis]. "When busing began in 1978, the schools were 63 percent
black.... Pupil populations... dropped since the case began, from 132,000 to 74,000." Id.
On the basis of achievement test performance, the Cleveland Public Schools "ranked 595th out
of 600 school districts in Ohio, and 95th out of 96 school districts in the seven-county Greater
Cleveland area[,]" in August of 1995. See Benson, supra. However, after these rankings were
corrected to account for the negative effects of poverty, "Cleveland students ranked eighth among 96
Greater Cleveland students [sic]." Id. Nevertheless, the educational outcomes of students attending
Cleveland Public Schools were abysmal. See id.
21. See generally supra nn. 9-19 and accompanying text. Note also that on January 31, 1995, Vision
21 received only a C grade by a fifty person committee commissioned by the Cleveland superintendent
to monitor its implementation and results. See Patrice M. Jones, City Schools' "Vision 21" Reform
Plan Gets C Grade, The Plain Dealer 1B (Feb. 1, 1995) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD).
According to the committee, less than half of the Vision 21 programs were in place and no educational
performance progress had been achieved. Id. After the district's operations were taken over by the
state, the full-day kindergarten program, which was considered one of the most important Vision 21
reforms, was substantially cut to provide budget savings. See Patrice M. Jones, Kindergartens to Be
Trimmed: Full Days Seen As Too Costly, The Plain Dealer 2B (May 27, 1995) (available in LEXIS,
News Library, CLEVPD).
22. See generally supra n. 11 and accompanying text.
23. Takeover Order, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814 at **7-9.
24. Ohio H. 152, § 1, 1993 Ohio Laws File 30 (June 30, 1993) (available in Westlaw at OH-LEGIS-
OLD).
25. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.98(B)-(G) as stated in Ohio H. 152, § 1, 1993 Ohio Laws File 30.
The right was limited in that the receiving adjacent district had to agree to participate, id. § 3313.98(B),
and the student would not be allowed to transfer to the adjacent district if:
(1) The adjacent district's student population was already taxing capacity limits on grade levels,
buildings or programs, id. § 3313.98(B)(2)(b)(i);
(2) There was not room for the student after the adjacent district accommodated all native
students and previously attending adjacent district students, id. § 3313.98(B)(2)(b)(ii);
(3) The student's enrollment would violate procedures established to maintain appropriate
racial balances in the receiving and sending school districts, id. §§ 3313.98(B)(2)(b)(iii),
3313.98(F)(1)(a);
(4) The student had been a particularly difficult discipline problem to his/her native district; id. §
3313.98(C)(4); or
(5) The student required special services not offered by the adjacent district. Id. §
3313.98(C)(2).
26. See Benson, supra n. 20.
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districts in accordance with a policy contained in the resolution., 27 Even though
the receiving adjacent districts received additional state funding equal to (their
basic per pupil state aid amount multiplied by the number of non-vocational
students accepted from an adjacent district) plus (state aid covering the excess
costs of any non-vocational student "receiving special education and related
services"),28 none of the districts adjacent to the Cleveland School District had
chosen to participate as of October, 1995.29 So, prior to the enactment of Ohio's
Voucher Program, "no Cleveland students had the opportunity to transfer.,
30
Given the dreadful academic and financial circumstances of the Cleveland
Public Schools, the failure of the Vision 21 reform movement, the dim prospects
for significant improvements anytime soon, and the exclusion of Cleveland
students from Ohio's public school choice program, it was certainly
understandable why low-income Cleveland families who valued education began
to support the enactment of a school voucher plan that would enable their
children to attend private schools.3 The intensity of these parents' support of
vouchers was captured perfectly in interchanges that occurred during a January
31, 1995, legislative lobbying effort led by Cleveland Councilwoman Fannie M.
Lewis. One parent, Genevieve Mitchell, told legislators that "[t]he public schools
are preparing black children for prison, the welfare office or the graveyard,...
[and a]s a black parent, that's unacceptable. 32 When confronted by an anti-
voucher state senator who represented her ward, "Lewis yanked the microphone
away from [him,] and ignored his request for an apology [by saying] 'I'm sure no
legislator in his right mind is going to tell us we can't have a choice[.]"' 33 In
response to an anti-voucher State Representative's assertion that "[t]he question
before us is how do we improve the public schools. . .," Leonard Cummings...
"wanted to know how he could make a better choice than public schools for his
[five-year old] daughter.. . ." "'If the government's not going to do it,' Cummings
said, 'you have to take charge and do it yourself.' 34
In 1995, these parents found a receptive audience in Ohio's Republican
Governor, George V. Voinovich, and an Ohio General Assembly that was totally
controlled by the Republicans for the first time in over twenty years. 35 On January
27. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.98(B) as stated in Ohio H. 152, § 1, 1993 Ohio Laws File 30.
28. Id. § 3313.981(B)(1)-(2).
29. See Benson, supra n. 20.
30. Id.
31. See Scott Stephens, Storming the Statehouse; Local Voucher Plan Supporters State Their Case in




35. See Mary Beth Lane, State Republican Majority Targets School Issues, The Plain Dealer 14B
(Dec. 18, 1994) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD), reporting that Governor Voinovich
was introducing a school voucher program and that the "Senate is eager to work with ... House
revolutionaries to reshape education in the GOP mold." In that vein, Rep. Michael A. Fox, the new
chair of the House Education Committee, declared that "I've waited 20 years to put my oar in the
[education reform] water and I'll be damned if my will will weaken now." Id. This plan was adopted
through a state budget bill that was "the first written in 22 years by a General Assembly completely
[Vol. 38:329
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31, 1995, Governor Voinovich presented his original voucher proposal, which
"call[ed] for poor parents in selected school districts to receive a $2500 voucher
they c[ould] apply to their children's tuition at a private or parochial school of
their choice. 36 The "proposal did not specify the communities in which the pilot
plan would be tested, but the governor said an area with a high level of poverty-
such as the Cleveland School District-would be the likely candidate."37 In light
of the court-ordered state takeover of the Cleveland Public Schools, on May 19,
1995, Governor Voinovich abandoned his original proposal and backed a House
plan to create a limited voucher experiment and implement it only in the
Cleveland School District.3' He did so because he believed "Cleveland's troubled
schools might be the best environment to determine if pupils can benefit from
vouchers. 
39
The House plan was signed into law on June 30, 1995, and it provided in
relevant part that "[t]he superintendent of public instruction shall establish a pilot
project scholarship program in one school district that, as of March 1995, was
under a federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of
the district by the state superintendent., 40 In response to nettlesome litigation
challenging the constitutionality of the voucher law, the General Assembly
broadened the district selection criteria to include "any school districts that are or
have ever been under federal court order requiring supervision and operational
management of the district by the state superintendent."41  However, the
Cleveland School District is still the only school district participating in Ohio's
Voucher Program, since it is the only school district that has ever been taken over
42by the state pursuant to a federal court order.
Consistent with its experimental nature, and Ohio's modest state funding of
common education, the Ohio Voucher Program is severely limited in scope.
ruled by the GOP," for in the previous session the House had been controlled by the Democrats. See
Thomas Suddes, Budget Accord Has Few Surprises; Hightlights Are Tax Cut and Voucher Pilot, The
Plain Dealer 1A (June 25, 1995) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD).
36. See Stephens, supra n. 31.
37. Id.
38. See Thomas Suddes, Governor Urges Cleveland Vouchers; Wants Mandatory School Program
As a Test, The Plain Dealer 6B (May 20, 1995) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD).
39. Accordingly, the Governor said, "Let's stick it in Cleveland. Let's try it. Let's see if it works."
Id.
40. Ohio H. 117, § 1, 1995 Ohio Laws File 28 (June 30, 1995) (available in Westlaw at OH-LEGIS-
OLD).
41. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(A). The current criteria was enacted into law at the end of the
1997 legislative session, Ohio H. 215, 1997 Ohio Laws File 37 (June 30, 1997) (available in Westlaw at
OH-LEGIS-OLD), after the original district selection law had been declared by an Ohio Court of
Appeals to be a violation of the Uniformity Clause of Ohio's Constitution because it applied to only
one school district. Simmons-Harriss v. Goff, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1766 at **35-39 (10th Dist. May
1, 1997). These criteria were reenacted by the General Assembly in 1999, Ohio H. 282, § 1, 1999 Ohio
Laws File 37 (June 29, 1999) (available in Westlaw at OH-LEGIS-OLD), to revive the Ohio Voucher
Program after the Ohio Supreme Court declared that its original enactment as a part of House Bill 117
violated Ohio's single subject rule. Simmons-Harriss v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 214-16 (Ohio 1999).
42. See Ruth E. Sternberg, Columbus Diocese Not Counting on Vouchers; Lawmakers, Parents on
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Vouchers are available only to the extent that the General Assembly chooses to
fund them 3.4  In its first full year of operation, academic year 1996-97, the Voucher
Program was allocated only five million dollars as compared to $136 million
allocated the previous year to provide transportation to students attending private
schools, to "help private schools comply with state laws and regulations," and to
help private schools with "auxiliary services that cover such things as textbooks,
science equipment and reading and math help." 44  The Voucher Program is
scheduled to receive only $18,066,820 in fiscal year 2003.41 "In the 1999-2000
school year .... [m]ore than 3,700 students participated in the ... program46 out of
the "more than 75,000 children enrolled in the Cleveland School District.,
47
The Voucher Program establishes that scholarships paid by the state to
educate voucher recipients will not exceed $2,250, 48 a level that appears to have
been set by reference to tuition normally charged by private parochial schools.49
Scholarships are available only to students who reside in the Cleveland School
District.5 °  Recipients may use voucher scholarships only to attend grades
kindergarten through eight at registered private schools located within the
Cleveland School District or participating public schools located in districts
adjacent to the Cleveland School District.5 As a practical matter, however,
43. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(C)(1)-(2).
44. Ohio Sen. 310, 1996 Ohio Laws File 179 (June 18, 1996) (available in Westlaw at OH-LEGIS-
OLD); see Ohio Subsidizing Private Schools at Expense of Public, Report Says, The Columbus
Dispatch 4B (July 22,1996) (available in LEXIS, News Library, COLDIS).
45. Ohio H. 299, § 3, 2001 Ohio Laws File 19 (June 29, 2001) (available in Westlaw at OH-LEGIS-
OLD).
46. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
47. Id. at 2463.
48. Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3313.978(C)(1) provides that "[in the case of basic
scholarships, the scholarship amount shall not exceed the lesser of the tuition charges of the alternative
school the scholarship recipient attends or an amount established by the state superintendent not in
excess of twenty-five hundred dollars." (Note, however, the superintendent is required to provide
increased basic scholarships to mainstreamed handicapped students and separately educated
handicapped students at levels set after consideration of "the instruction, related services, and
transportation costs of educating such students." Id. § 3313.978(C)(2)). But the state will only pay
families of voucher students seventy-five percent or ninety percent of the basic scholarship amount
depending on their income. Id. § 3313.978(A).
49. At the beginning of 1992, most private schools charged tuition of $2,000 or less, and one of the
sponsor's of a voucher bill that failed that year expected that most voucher recipients would attend
parochial schools. Mary Yost, Legislative Plan Seeks Test of Public vs. Private Schools, The Columbus
Dispatch 4D (Jan. 24, 1992) (available in LEXIS, News Library, COLDIS). During the first year of the
Voucher Program, it was reported that "[a]n analysis of eight of 31 ... Catholic schools [participating
in the Voucher Program] found that the cost of teaching a student was $1,849 for the 1996-97 school
year-45 percent more than the average $1,272 tuition charged by the schools." See Catherine
Candisky, Vouchers No Ticket to Wealth; Report: Catholic Schools Lose Money, The Columbus
Dispatch 1B (Dec. 24, 1996) (available in LEXIS, News Library, COLDIS).
50. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(A).
51. With respect to the grade limitations, Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3313.975(C)(1) states in
relevant part that "[i]n each year the program continues, no new students may receive scholarships
unless they are enrolled in grade kindergarten, one, two or three. However, any student who has
received a scholarship the preceding year may continue to receive one until the student has completed
grade eight." Section 3313.975(A) provides in relevant part that "[t]he program shall provide for a
number of students residing in ... [a participating] district to ... attend alternative schools[.]" The
term "alternative school" is defined as "a registered private school located in a school district or a
10
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voucher students may only attend private schools within the Cleveland School
District, because, to date, public schools in adjacent school districts have not
participated in the Voucher Program52 even though they would receive the
student's basic scholarship plus the per-pupil amount paid by the state to the
voucher student's native district under the foundation aid formula. 53 Fifty-six
private schools participated in the program in the 1999-2000 academic year.5 4 Of
great relevance to the Zelman Establishment Clause challenge was the fact that
"46 or (82%) of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation 5 5 and
"96% of voucher students attended religious schools."
56
Ohio's Voucher Program only modestly favors low-income families despite
its proponents' claims that low-income families would be its primary clients. The
state superintendent is to give preference to low-income families in establishing
criteria for selecting students to receive scholarships, 7 but this advantage is
neutralized somewhat by the fact that up to "fifty percent of all scholarships [may
be] awarded... [to] students who were enrolled in a nonpublic school during the
school year of application for a scholarship., 58 Moreover, low-income families
must pay ten percent of the tuition charged by the private schools their children
attend up to a maximum of $250, or provide the schools with in-kind services
public school located in an adjacent school district." Id. § 3313.974(G). Registered private schools are
those that meet the following requirements:
(1) The school is located within the boundaries of the pilot project school district;
(2) The school indicates in writing its commitment to follow all requirements for a state-
sponsored scholarship program;
(3) The school meets all state minimum standards for chartered nonpublic schools in effect on
July 1, 1992, except that the state superintendent at the superintendent's discretion may
register nonchartered nonpublic schools meeting the other requirements of this division;
(4) The school does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background;
(5) The school enrolls a minimum of ten students per class or a sum of at least twenty-five
students in all the classes offered;
(6) The school does not advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or
group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion;
(7) The school does not provide false or misleading information about the school to parents,
students, or the general public;
(8) The school agrees not to charge any tuition to low-income families participating in the
scholarship program in excess of ten per cent of the scholarship amount established... [by
the Voucher Program] excluding any increase described in ... [the program]. The school
shall permit any such tuition, at the discretion of the parent, to be satisfied by the low-
income family's provision of in-kind contributions or services.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(1)-(8). Public schools within school districts adjacent to the pilot
project district will not be deemed alternative schools unless "the superintendent of the district in
which such public school is located notifies the state superintendent prior to the first day of March that
the district intends to admit students from the pilot project district for the ensuing school year .... " Id.
§ 3313.976(C).
52. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2624.
53. See id. More specifically, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.979(B) (the voucher scholarship
amount) and id. § 3317.022(A)(1) (formula for computing state base cost funding).
54. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2624.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.978(A).
58. Id. § 3313.975(B).
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equal in value to that amount.5 9 In addition, even families earning up to 200
percent of the low-income family's maximum earnings may receive ninety percent
of the basic scholarship, and families earning more may receive seventy-five
percent of the basic scholarship.60 As for gaining admission to participating
private schools, low-income students are given preference only as to twenty
percent of the seats at each grade level for kindergarten through third grade to the
extent that they that remain open after the private schools admit students who
attended the previous year and the siblings of such students. 61  It is perhaps
instructive that only sixty percent of the 3,700 voucher students "were from
61families at or below the poverty line" during the 1999-2000 school year.
III. THE CONSERVATIVES' NEUTRALITY TEST:
ITS DEVELOPMENT & EVOLUTION
Ohio's Voucher Program provides government funding that subsidizes a
substantial portion of parochial school tuition paid by recipient families.63 Not
only do these tuition subsidies enable students to attend private religious schools
who otherwise could not afford it,64 they also further parochial schools' religious
65purposes by enabling them to expose more students to their religious tenets.
59. The state will provide low-income families with ninety percent of the basic scholarship amount,
id. § 3313.978(A), and voucher students from low-income families may not be charged more than ten
percent of the basic scholarship amount by any private school they attend. Id. § 3313.976(A)(8).
Further, the private school must permit the low-income family's share of the tuition "to be satisfied by
the low-income family's provision of in-kind contributions or services." Id.
60. Id. § 3313.978(A).
61. Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3313.977(A)(1) states that:
Each registered private school shall admit students to kindergarten and first, second and
third grades in accordance with the following priorities:
(a) Students who were enrolled in the school during the preceding year;
(b) Siblings of students enrolled in the school during the preceding year, at the
discretion of the school;
(c) Children from low-income families attending school or residing in the school
district in which the school is located until the number of such students in each
grade equals the number that constituted twenty per cent of the total number of
students enrolled in the school during the preceding year in such grade ... 
62. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
63. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.977(A)(1), 3313.978(A), 3313.978(C)(1); text accompanying
supra nn. 48, 59-60.
64. Thus, a voucher proponent, who also was a member of a public school board of education,
wrote an impassioned editorial in the fall of 1994 in which she noted that "[w]ealthy families
already.., practice... [school choice] by buying homes in the school district they select or by sending
their children to private schools[, but p]oor families, and even middle-class families, lack the same
choices." Deborah L. Owens, School Choice: Parental Empowerment, or Sabotage of Public Schools?
Program Would Free Middle-Class Families from Government Monopoly on Education, The Columbus
Dispatch 9A (Sept. 14, 1994). Believing this was inequitable, she proposed that Ohio establish a
voucher program that "would allow many families to exercise school choice .. " Id.
65. In December, 2001, a team of Rand Institute scholars released a new study of school vouchers
and charter schools. In comparing program content of voucher and charter schools, the study found
that "[f]or many private schools, adherence to a particular educational philosophy-whether based on
Roman Catholic faith or the teachings of Maria Montessori, for example, is their primary reason for
existence and their primary focus of difference from conventional public schools." Brian P. Gill, P.
Michael Timpane, Karen E. Ross & Dominic J. Brewer, Rhetoric Versus Reality: What We Know and
What We Need to Know about Voucher and Charter Schools 64 (Rand 2001) (emphasis added). And,
12
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Illustrative of the religious missions of parochial schools participating in the Ohio
Voucher Program are passages from the parent-student handbooks of such
schools quoted in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion. Saint Jerome School
professed that "FAITH must dominate the entire educational process so that the
child can make decisions according to Catholic values and choose to lead a
Christian Life., 66 The Westside Baptist Christian School proclaimed that "Christ
is the basis of all learning. All subjects will be taught from the Biblical perspective
that all truth is God's truth. 67 It was the specter of government money aiding the
religious missions of parochial schools that lead opponents of Ohio's Voucher
Program to file Establishment Clause challenges to its constitutionality in federal
district court.68
A. The Traditional Establishment Clause Test Applicable To Government Aid
Cases
69In the 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the United States Supreme Court
formulated an Establishment Clause test, the general principles of which govern
cases challenging the provision of government aid to religious private schools.7v
Known as the Lemon test, it involved a tripartite analysis of whether the aid (1)
has a secular purpose, (2) produces a "principal or primary effect.., that neither
advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) does "not foster 'an excessive
entanglement with religion.'
71
In cases involving government providing material aid to religious private
schools, the Court virtually accepted at face value the government's insistence that
its purpose is to advance the cause of secular education, so the Court's purpose
inquiries in these cases have been quite perfunctory. 2 By applying the effects
prong of the Lemon test, until conservative Justices began their movement toward
a neutral selection/private choice analysis, the Court developed a consensus that
government aid to religious private schools violates the Establishment Clause if it
Justice Souter observed in his Zelman dissent that Ohio's vouchers "will thus pay for eligible students'
instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion as well, in schools that can fairly be characterized
as founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension."
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2486 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (quoting from the Saint Jerome School Parent and Student Handbook: 1999-2000, at 1).
67. Id. (quoting from the Westside Baptist Christian School Parent-Student Handbook, at 7).
68. Br. for Respt. at 3-5, Zelman, 122 S. Ct. 2460.
69. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218, 222 (1997), wherein the Court noted that the case
under review was first decided in 1985 by application of the test laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), and that "the general principles we use to evaluate whether government aid violates
the Establishment Clause have not changed since ... [that case] was decided."
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
72. For example, in Lemon the Court found that state programs to enhance the salaries of parochial
school teachers who taught only secular subjects served the secular purpose of "enhanc[ing] the quality
of the secular education in all schools covered by... compulsory attendance laws." Id. at 613. See
School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985), where the Court began its
Establishment Clause analysis by observing that "[a]s has often been true in school aid cases, there is
no dispute as to the first test." Id. at 3222.
20021
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supports, or threatens to support, the schools' religious missions.73 The Court
used the entanglement prong to determine whether the government aid program
would necessitate the creation of a comprehensive monitoring program to ensure
that aid was not used improperly for religious purposes, involve close
administrative cooperation, or provoke political divisiveness.
To the Court, the key to preventing government aid from advancing a
religious mission was to restrict severely the ability of government to provide aid
to pervasively sectarian recipients. Recipients were classified as pervasively
sectarian if "a substantial portion of... [their] functions [we]re subsumed in...
religious mission[s].,, 75  Given this definition of pervasively sectarian, the Court
believed there was always a high risk that any aid provided to a pervasively
sectarian organization will somehow advance religion,76 for in pervasively
sectarian schools "'the secular education ... goes hand in hand with the religious
mission... [so that] the two are inextricably intertwined.' 7  As a consequence, in
73. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 876-78 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Government aid was
deemed to have advanced a religious school's religious mission if it created the risk that the aid would
be used to "indoctrinate... students in particular religious tenets at public expense ... , [create a]
symbolic union of church and state ... [that] threatens to covey a message of state support for religion
to students and to the general public[, or] ... subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools
by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects." Ball, 473 U.S.
at 397.
74. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-14 (1985). According to the Court, the problem with
pervasive monitoring and close administrative cooperation is that they:
produce "a ... continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to
minimize," which may increase "the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines"
because government agents must make "numerous judgments ... concern[ing] matters that
may be subtle and controversial ... [and] of deep religious significance to the controlling
denominations," and "raise[ I more than an imagined specter of governmental secularization
of a creed."
Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted). In addition, the Court has raised concern that certain types of aid to
religious schools could provoke "political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice... [if they
involve a] need for continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands
as costs and populations grow." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
75. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 752 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
So, for example, Roman Catholic elementary and secondary schools were often classified as
pervasively sectarian because they tended to be "located close to parish churches," have school
buildings filled with "identifying religious symbols" (crosses, crucifixes, religious paintings, religious
statues), make "instruction in faith and morals [a] part of the total educational process," sponsor
"religiously oriented extracurricular activities," have faculties comprised substantially of nuns or
priests, and be "dedicated... [to] provide an atmosphere in which religious instruction and religious
vocations are natural and proper parts of life .... " See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-16. By contrast,
religiously affiliated colleges were not labeled pervasively sectarian unless they possessed most of the
following characteristics: "impose[ ] religious restrictions on admissions, require[ ] attendance at
religious activities, compel[ ] obedience to the doctrines and dogmas of the faith, require[ I instruction
in theology and doctrine, and... propagate a particular religion." See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 682 (1971).
76. See e.g. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616-19, where the Court declared unconstitutional a government
financed salary supplement for nonpublic school teachers who taught secular subjects largely because it
believed that the pervasively religious atmosphere in which they taught created a substantial risk that
the teachers would intentionally or inadvertently interject religious content into their secular courses.
77. Ball, 473 U.S. at 384 (internal citation omitted). This finding directly contradicted the Court's
finding in Board of Education of Central School District No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968), that it
could not "agree with appellants either that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the
processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to
students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion."
14
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Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen,78 the Court indicated
that any aid government provides a pervasively sectarian organization must be
supplemental in the sense that it will not supplant anything the pervasively
sectarian organization was already committed to providing.79  In Meek v.
Pittenger,'° the Court cast doubt that government could give even supplemental
educational aid to pervasively sectarian schools by holding that any substantial aid
to the education missions of pervasively sectarian schools inevitably benefits their
religious missions.8 ' Despite the Court's indication in Lemon that government
could provide pervasively sectarian schools with "secular, neutral, ... non-
ideological services, facilities, or materials," such as "[b]us transportation, school
lunches, public health services, and secular textbooks, 82 in Meek the Court held
that such secular aid could not be given directly to a pervasively sectarian school.
83
In Allen and Meek the Court signaled that government could provide aid
indirectly to pervasively sectarian schools by giving it directly to students, for the
Court upheld state programs for loaning text books directly to students of
pervasively sectarian schools because "no funds or books [we]re furnished to
parochial schools, and the financial benefit [went] to parents and children, not [to]
schools." 84 But, in Wolman v. Walter,5 the Court held that government programs
for directly providing to students attending pervasively sectarian schools such
neutral and secular aid as instructional materials and equipment produced a
primary effect indistinguishable from the effect produced by the aid program
invalidated in Meek.86 Therefore, the Court refused to distinguish Wolman from
Meek because to do so would "exalt form over substance. 87 The Court also
indicated in Wolman that government could not provide pervasively sectarian
schools with neutral and secular aid, such as projectors, that could be diverted
88from secular uses to religious uses. Furthermore, in Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,8 the Court invalidated a program
providing parents with children in non-public schools either partial tuition
reimbursements or tax relief in the form of tuition deductions because the
pervasively sectarian nature of most of the state's non-public schools led it to
78. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
79. See id. at 244 n. 6; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 896-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
81. Id. at 363-66.
82. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616.
83. Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-66.
84. Id. at 360-62; Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44.
85. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
86. Id. at 249-51. The impermissible effect arose because the secular and religious missions of
pervasively sectarian schools are so intertwined that "[slubstantial aid to the educational function of
such schools ... necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole." Id. at 250
(citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 251 n. 18.
89. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
2002]
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conclude that the program's primary effect was to advance religion by
encouraging parents to send their children to religious schools.
9 °
B. The Conservatives' Neutral Selection / Private Choice Neutrality Test
The Court began dismantling its restrictions on providing aid to pervasively
sectarian schools in 1983, when, in Mueller v. Allen,91 a majority comprised of
conservative Justices upheld a Minnesota tax provision allowing the parents of
public and private school children to deduct certain educational expenses,
including tuition, for purposes of calculating their state income taxes. 92 In doing
so, the Court distinguished Mueller from Nyquist with respect to the nature of the
benefit conferred and the way it was packaged. The Mueller tax deductions were
available only for expenditures on educational goods and services of the type the
Court had previously permitted government to furnish attendees of sectarian
schools.93 By comparison, the Court characterized the deduction involved in
Nyquist as "thinly disguised 'tax benefits,' actually amounting to tuition grants." 94
Most significantly, the Court noted that the benefited class in Mueller included
parents of all Minnesota school children instead of just those parents who sent
their children to non-public schools. 95 This distinction was crucial, for the Court
believed the broader class of beneficiaries made the tax deduction "neutrally
available to nonreligious as well as religious... [taxpayers]." 96
The Court also distinguished Mueller from cases where government aid was
found to have gone directly to the schools by noting that the tax benefit first went
to parents of private school students.97 As a consequence, any financial advantage
the tax deduction conferred on religious schools was the "result of numerous,
private choices of individual parents of school-age children." 98  This laid the
groundwork for undermining Wolman's holding that channeling government aid
to a pervasively sectarian school by giving it first to parents or students was as
impermissible as providing the aid directly to a pervasively sectarian school. After
opining that in the twentieth century "[t]he risk of significant religious or
denominational control over our democratic processes-or even of deep political
divisi[veness] along religious lines-is remote," the Court found any such
remaining risk to be "entirely tolerable in light of the [positive contributions of
90. Id. at 780-87, 789-94.
91. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
92. Id. at 390-91 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., White, Powell & O'Connor, JJ., majority
opinion).
93. Id. at 393-94.
94. Id. at 394.
95. Id. at 397-99.
96. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (modifying a quotation in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981),
in order to make an analogy between the effects of the tax deduction and the opportunity for religious
and non-religious speakers to participate in a designated public forum established by a public
university).
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sectarian schools and the Court's] continuing oversight ... ,,9 The Court also
stated that consideration of the potential for political divisiveness should be
"confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or
to teachers in parochial schools."'0° Most importunately, the Court undercut the
technique used in Nyquist to demonstrate that the aid was intended to benefit
religious schools-empirical research showing that most of the benefits would go
to parents with children in religious schools-by refusing to consider similar
empirical studies because it was "loath to adopt a rule grounding the
constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."10 1
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 102 a 1986 case,
further undermined Wolman's holding that funneling aid to the education
program of a pervasively sectarian school through the conduit of a private
individual impermissibly advances religion. Although he was blind, Witters was
denied a rehabilitation grant he otherwise was qualified to receive, for his desire
to attend a Bible College led the Washington Supreme Court to hold that his
receipt of the grant would violate the state's policy of not allowing these grants to
be used to further religious careers.0 3 The Court came to this holding out of belief
that it was necessary to prevent a violation of the Establishment Clause
violation.1 4 Had he received the grant, Witters would have transmitted it to the
Bible college.0 5 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Washington
Supreme Court's decision, holding that any aid reaching a religious school under
the grant program would be the result of a private choice rather than an act of the
statei °6 The Court also held that the grant program did not create any "financial
incentive for students to undertake sectarian education,"'0 7 for it was "'made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." 0 08 Thus, religion would neither be
advanced nor endorsed if grant recipients used the to grants to obtain a religious
education.0 9 Finally, the Court attached importance to the fact that no
"significant portion of the aid expended under the ... program as a whole will end
up flowing to religious education[, for tihe function of the.., program.., does
99. Id. at 400.
100. Id. at 403 n. 11.
101. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
102. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
103. Id. at 483-84.
104. Id. at 482.
105. Id. at 487-88.
106. Id. at 487-89. The majority was comprised of four liberals-Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackman, and Stevens-and four conservatives-Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Powell,
and Rehnquist.
107. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
108. Id. at 488 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83).
109. Id. at 488-89.
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not seem well suited to serve as a vehicle" for "provid[ing] desired financial
support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions."" °
Inexplicably, the majority opinion in Witters did not, in any substantive way,
rely on Mueller."' Although four of the Court's five conservative justices joined
the majority opinion, all five expressed through concurring opinions their belief
that the principles of Mueller controlled the outcome of Witters, and that nothing
in Witters undermined or weakened Mueller. 1 2 In his concurrence, Justice Powell
provided the following succinct black-letter summary of the conservatives' take on
Mueller: "[Sitate programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the...
[effects] test, because any aid to religion results from the private choices of
individual beneficiaries.".. 3
Relying heavily on Mueller and Witters, a bare majority comprised of
conservative Justices held in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.,"4 a 1993
case, that it did not violate the Establishment Clause for a federal program
offering aid to people with disabilities to provide a sign language interpreter to a
deaf high school student enrolled in a pervasively sectarian school."5 Mueller and
Witters were cited as prime support for the proposition "that government
programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined
without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated ...
benefit."" 6 Applying that proposition, the Court found that the benefits program
provided no incentive for a person to attend a sectarian school because it defined
beneficiaries neutrally by their disabilities." 7 The Court concluded that the
provision of a government-paid interpreter to a student at a sectarian school did
not violate the Establishment Clause since the interpreter arrived at a sectarian
school only as a result of the private choice of the student and his parents. 
8
However, the Court did not simply justify its opinion solely on the neutral
selection / private choice mantra, for it went on to emphasize that:
no funds traceable to the government ever find their way into sectarian schools'
coffers... [and that t]he only indirect economic benefit a sectarian school might
receive ... is the disabled child's tuition- ... assuming [of course] that the school
makes a profit on each student; that, without [the aid] ... the child would have gone
110. Id. at 488.
111. Id. at 490-92 (Powell, J.,joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring).
112. Witters, 474 U.S. at 490 (White, J., concurring); id. at 490-92 (Powell, Rehnquist, JJ., & Burger,
C.J., concurring); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 490-91 (Powell, Rehnquist, JJ., & Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing Mueller, 463 U.S. at
398-99).
114. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
115. Id. at 3 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., majority opinion).
116. Id. at 8-10.
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to school elsewhere; and that the school, then, would have been unable to fill that
child's spot.
119
Most critically, the Court rejected assertions that in Meek and Ball it had
made the supplying of an interpreter unconstitutional by striking down programs
for providing secular services and education on the premises of religious school
with government-paid personnel. 120 The Court characterized Meek and Ball as
standing mainly for the proposition that government impermissibly advances
religion by providing substantial aid to the educational mission of a pervasively
sectarian school because this relieves the "schools of costs they otherwise would
have borne in educating their students., 121 Applying this proposition, the Court
found that the aid program at issue in Zobrest would neither provide sectarian
schools with substantial benefits nor relieve them of any "expense [they] otherwise
would have assumed in educating [their] students.' '122  The Court then
emphatically rejected the assertion that the Establishment Clause bars "the
placing of a public employee in a sectarian school" by finding that "[s]uch a flat
rule, smacking of antiquated notions of 'taint,' would indeed exalt form over
substance.' 2 3 With respect to substance, the Court concluded that there was little
risk that a sign language interpreter would impermissibly advance religion by
finding that he or she "would do [no] more than accurately interpret whatever
material is presented to the class as a whole.' 24
In sum, the neutrality test developed by conservatives through Mueller,
Witters, and Zobrest certainly provided a pathway around the barriers erected by
the pervasively sectarian doctrine to government providing aid to pervasively
sectarian schools. In each case, great emphasis was placed on the fact that aid first
flowed from government to private individuals, who received it by meeting
religiously neutral eligibility criteria, and then reached a sectarian school only
because of the private choices of the government beneficiaries. However, Mueller
was partially decided on the basis that its benefits were not in reality devices for
government subsidizing tuition payments to sectarian institutions disguised as tax
deductions. 125 Likewise, in Witters the Court supported its decision with the
conclusion that the government assistance program was not "well suited to serve
as a vehicle" of "provid[ing] desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian
institutions.' '2 6 Even in Zobrest, the Court added more analysis beyond the facial
neutrality of the program to demonstrate that the program did not substantially
121
aid the religious mission of a sectarian school. In Witters and Zobrest, the Court
assessed the constitutionality of the government benefit being challenged by
119. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-11.
120. Id. at 11-13,
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
125. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95; see text accompanying supra notes 93-94.
126. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; see text accompanying supra notes 110.
127. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-11; see text accompanying supra notes 119.
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focusing exclusively on the options a person might pursue with the benefit rather
than analyzing all possible life options he could have pursued without it.'
28
IV. THE POST-ZELMAN NEUTRALITY TEST:
A UNIVERSAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANTIDOTE
Facially, the Ohio Voucher Program meets the main prongs of the
conservatives' neutral selection, private choice Establishment Clause test. As
noted earlier, the scholarships provided by the program can be used at any public
school in a district adjacent to the Cleveland School District, or any private school,
religious or otherwise, within the Cleveland School District.129  Beneficiary
families are selected on the basis of where their children attend school, 3 ° what
grades their children are in,"' the levels of their income, and how many
scholarships are available relative to demand.'33 A religious private school will
receive voucher revenue only if voucher recipients make private choices to attend
it.134 So, on the face of it, Ohio's Voucher Program selects beneficiaries on the
basis of religiously neutral selection criteria, the beneficiaries' options include
public and private schools, and a religious private school will receive money only
as a result of the private choices of voucher recipients.
In reality, as documented previously, not a single public school district
adjacent to the Cleveland School District has chosen to participate in Ohio's
Voucher Program, so a voucher recipient's only real choice is to attend a private
school located within the Cleveland School District."' This outcome was readily
predictable. Cleveland's history of desegregation conflict lead directly to white
and middle class families fleeing the Cleveland School District to nearby school
districts so their children would not have to attend dysfunctional schools with
large numbers of poor minority students.'36 Ohio's dependency on local property
taxes to supply a high percentage of school funding provides economic
128. So, in Witters, the Court focused on the myriad of educational and training programs that could
be pursued using the government aid, see Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88; and in Zobrest, the Court noted
that persons receiving a sign language interpreter were free to attend a public school, a private non-
religious school or a private religious school. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10. In Mueller, the Court did find it
important in the context of tax policy that the education deduction was one of several tax deductions
available, but it appeared to have limited this "broader look" approach to tax deductions by
commenting that "[o]ur decisions consistently have recognized that traditionally '[liegislatures have
especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes."' Mueller, 463 U.S.
at 396.
129. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(C)(1); see text accompanying supra note 51.
130. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(A); see text accompanying supra note 50.
131. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(C)(1); see text accompanying supra note 51.
132. See text accompanying supra notes 58-62.
133. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(B).
134. See id. § 3313.978(A)(1)-(2).
135. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2624; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(C)(1); supra nn. 52-53 and
accompanying text.
136. See Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 1999) (white flight). Note that from 1970-1990,
"[m]ore than twice as many whites as blacks moved out of the city... [so that] [t]he white population
decreased 45 percent ... while the black population decreased 18 percent [and] ... [t]he population of
Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians increased by 274 percent .... " See Cleveland Crisis, supra n.
20 (middle class flight).
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disincentives for school districts to accept transfer students, since the per pupil
revenues attributable to the former district's local property taxes do not follow the
student to the new district, 37 and the per pupil property tax level in the receiving
district may be much higher than the scholarship provided by Ohio's Voucher
Program.1 38 Most importantly, the failure of Ohio's public school choice law to
serve Cleveland students certainly should have put Ohio legislators on notice that
the public school option in the Ohio Voucher Program would be useless. 39 Given
these circumstances, a good argument could be made that the Ohio Voucher
Program's public school choice was just window dressing designed to meet the
facial requirements of the conservatives' neutrality test.14°
In absence of a real public school choice, the Ohio Voucher Program's
scholarship begins to resemble the so-called "tax deduction" that was found to be
in violation of the Establishment Clause in Nyquist. As in Nyquist, the Ohio
voucher recipients' choices are limited to private schools. The voucher benefit is
intended explicitly to fund a considerable portion of the recipients' private school
tuition costs,141 so it functions as a tuition grant, just as did the Nyquist tax
deduction. 42
Most significantly, Ohio's Voucher Program seems to produce effects that
would not pass muster under the more substantive effects analyses used in by the
Court to bolster its holdings in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest. By design and
circumstances, it seems geared to directing government money into the coffers of
parochial schools. Its voucher scholarship levels seem to have been set in
accordance with the tuition levels of most parochial schools, 43 so they appear to
be too low to be attractive to public schools in adjacent districts. 44 Parochial
schools predominate in Ohio generally,145 and in Cleveland specifically, 46 so the
great majority of private school students will inevitably attend parochial schools.
In fact, these factors worked predictably to funnel ninety-six percent of
Cleveland's voucher students into parochial schools, 47 so a "significant portion of
137. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2496, 2496 n. 17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. See id., wherein Justice Souter notes that "[tihe only adjacent district in which the voucher
amount is close enough to cover the local [property tax] contribution is East Cleveland City (local
[property tax] contribution, $2,019... ), but its public-school system hardly provides an attractive
alternative for Cleveland parents, as it too has been classified by Ohio an an 'academic emergency'
district."
139. See supra nn. 24-30 and accompanying text.
140. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2490-97 (Souter, J., dissenting), wherein Justice Souter notes that the
absence of participation by the adjacent public school districts and the tepid participation of
nonreligious private schools demonstrate that Cleveland Voucher Program is neither neutral as to
religion nor provides true private choice to voucher recipients.
141. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.978(A); see text accompanying supra notes 59-60.
142. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 789-94.
143. Supra n. 49.
144. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2624; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(C)(1); supra nn. 52-53 and
accompanying text.
145. Eighty-one percent of Ohio's private schools are religious schools. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at
2470.
146. Eighty-two percent of Cleveland's private schools are religious schools. See id.
147. Id. at 2624; see supra n. 56 and accompanying text.
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the aid expended under the... program as a whole will end up flowing to religious
education,"' 4 8 an effect about which the Court expressed disapproval in Witters."4
Given that the program was "enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school
system,"'"5 it is likely that without the scholarships most voucher students would
have gone to school elsewhere,' 51 an effect about which the Court expressed
disapproval in Zobrest.1
5 2
By comparison to the crabbed choices available to the beneficiaries of
Ohio's Voucher Program, the choices available to beneficiaries of the programs at
issue in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest were exceedingly broad. Almost every
person receiving a scholarship under Ohio's Voucher Program can realistically
expect to do only one thing with it: pay tuition at a parochial school located in the
Cleveland School District.'53 Conversely, in Mueller, expenditures for a large
array of educational expenses associated with any type of school, private or public,
secular or religious, could be deducted from the beneficiary's taxable income .
148. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
149. Id. at 488. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2496-97 (Souter, J., dissenting), where Justice Souter
complains that the lack of real choice makes it inevitable that ninety-six percent of voucher students
attend religious private schools.
150. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2625.
151. Thus, in an emotion-laden concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that Ohio, "[flaced with a
severe educational crisis,.., enacted a wide-ranging educational reform that allows voluntary
participation of private and religious schools in educating poor urban children otherwise condemned to
failing public schools." Id. at 2482 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Thomas also
noted that "'the appeal of private schools is especially strong among parents who are low in income,
minority and live in low-performing districts: precisely the parents who are the most disadvantaged
under the current system."' Id. at 2484 n. 7 (quoting from T. Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the
American Public 164 (Brookings Instn. Press 2001)).
152. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 11.
153. Supra nn. 52-56 and accompanying text.
154. A very diverse range of expenses qualified for the Minnesota income tax deduction at issue in
Mueller. First and foremost, were expenditures for tuition, textbooks, and transportation incurred in
sending children to "an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory
attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 ..." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390 n. 1 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (repealed
1987)). Other types of expenditures found to qualify for the deduction included:
1. Tuition in the ordinary sense.
2. Tuition to public school students who attend public schools outside their residence school
districts.
3. Certain summer school tuition.
4. Tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring services.
5. Tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school to students who are
physically unable to attend classes at such school.
6. Tuition charged by a private tutor or by a school that is not an elementary or secondary
school, if the instruction is acceptable for credit in an elementary or secondary school.
7. Montessori School tuition for grades K through 12.
8. Tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum.
Allowable deductions for transportation expenditures include the cost of transporting
students in school districts that do not provide free transportation, the cost of transporting
students who attend school in their residence district but who do not qualify for free
transportation because of proximity to their schools of attendance.
[Vol. 38:329
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The vocational rehabilitation assistance provided in Witters could be used to
pursue virtually any type of vocational training located anywhere in the state. 55
Similarly, the services available to disabled children through the program at issue
in Zobrest were greatly varied and could be used in any type of school, public or
private, secular or religious. 156  As a consequence, the operational realities of
Ohio's Voucher Program do not match the rationale and operational realities of
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, for Ohio voucher recipients have so few options that
they are virtually channeled to parochial schools.
Finally, as pervasively sectarian institutions, Cleveland's parochial schools
have religious missions that are inextricably intertwined with their educational
missions. As a result, both types of missions are furthered when voucher
students attend parochial schools.' 58 When a government program is designed or
operated in a manner such that it inevitably channels much of its benefits to
pervasively sectarian schools, it advances the schools' religious missions more as a
function of the intent or will of the government parties who designed it or operate
it than as a function of the private choices of parents who are served by it,i59
thereby violating the private choice requirement of the conservatives' neutrality
test."6
On the surface, none of the differences in the operational characteristics
between the Ohio Voucher Program and programs approved in Mueller, Witters,
and Zobrest seemed to matter to the Zelman majority. Ignoring the underlying
substantive effects analyses of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court asserted
Textbook deductions include not only secular textbooks but also other necessary equipment,
such as:
1. Cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education.
2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes.
3. Ice skates rental fee paid to the school.
4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for math classes.
5. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum requirements.
6. Costs of special metal or wood needed to meet minimum requirements of shop classes.
7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes.
8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments.
9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class.
Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D. Minn. 3rd Div. 1981), affd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982),
affd, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
155. In Witters, the Court expressly found that "[a]id recipients' choices are made among a huge
variety of possible careers, of which only a small handful are sectarian." Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
Indeed, the statute authorized the provision of aid to the blind such as "'special education and/or
training in the professions, business or trades' so as to 'assist visually handicapped persons to overcome
vocational handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and self-care."' Id. at 483
(quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 74.16.181 (1981)).
156. "The service at issue [in Zobrest] is a part of a general government program that distributes
benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped'..., without regard to the 'sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends." Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
157. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2486, 2486 n. 2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 2492-97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 2466 (The Court approvingly characterized the program at issue in Mueller as "one of
true private choice, with no evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward religious
schools .. ") (emphasis added).
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that its holdings in these cases stand for one great proposition: the Establishment
Clause cannot be violated by government aid programs that select beneficiaries
through religiously neutral criteria and provide benefits directly to those
beneficiaries so that aid only reaches religious schools as a function of the
beneficiaries' private choices.16 Under such circumstances, said the Court, "[t]he
incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a
religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. 1 62 Then, the
Court proclaimed that Ohio's Voucher Program was "a program of true private
choice, consistent with Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest," after analyzing only its
facial characteristics.
161
Inevitably, however, the majority was forced to explain away the operational
features of the Voucher Program that made it a less-than-perfect "true private
choice" program. In contradiction to the actual economic choices made by schools
and parents eligible to participate in the Voucher Program, the Court asserted
that "[t]here are no "financial incentive[s]" that "ske[w]" the program toward
religious schools."164  To prove this point, the majority claimed that adjacent
public schools could receive two or three times the amount of money available to
private schools, and that parents had a financial disincentive to choose religious
schools since they were required to pay part of the tuition themselves.
65
When analyzed by microeconomics principles, the Court's economic analysis
proves to be utter nonsense, for it fails to explain why none of the school districts
adjacent to Cleveland has agreed to accept voucher students. Micro-economics
asserts that a prospective seller's refusal to accept an offer results from the price
being either lower than the seller's marginal costs in a workably competitive
market, 66 or below the level at which the seller will receive marginal revenue that
at least equals its marginal costs in a market tending toward monopoly. 16  Thus,
161. Id. at 2466-67.
162. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467.
163. Id. at 2467-68, drawing this conclusion after citing to the program's selection criteria, asserting
that the program includes "all schools within the district, religious or non-religious," and noting that it
offers a financial incentive for adjacent public schools to participate. Id. at 2468.
164. Id. at 2468 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88).
165. Id. at 2468.
166. Here it is important to note that for economists, costs include not only explicit money outlays
made to finance the entity's operations, but also the non-monetized value of the best available
alternative use of the entity's resources. See Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, Economics
470-72 (12th ed., McGraw-Hill 1985). Under the assumption that there is perfect competition and that
the entity wants to maximize profits, its decision to produce and sell one more unit of its product is
determined by whether the price it can receive equals the costs of producing that next unit (marginal
cost). Id. at 477-80. For purposes of a school determining whether to accept one more student, the
relevant marginal costs will be the increase to total costs that the school would incur to educate the
next student to be admitted. See id. at 463. These costs will be quite low unless the addition of another
student requires the school to add teachers, classroom space, or expensive equipment.
167. For example, in a monopoly market, a firm will produce and sell one more unit of output if the
marginal revenue it will receive equals its marginal costs. At this point, the supply offered is less that
total demand for the product, so the monopolist can receive a price higher than his marginal costs. At
a lower price, the monopolist cannot receive marginal revenue equal to its marginal costs, so it will not
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the refusal of adjacent public school districts to accept voucher students could
have been a function of one of three causes:
(1) Total compensation available to adjacent public school districts was too low to
cover their marginal costs, which would validate Justice Souter's complaint that
the Ohio's Voucher Program's scholarship levels were set too low to enable
voucher recipients to have any attractive public school options;' 68 or
(2) The adjacent public school districts were attempting to extract monopoly
profits, which would justify the State intervening to require them to accept
voucher students;169 or
(3) The adjacent public school districts were simply discriminating against
Cleveland's children, in which case the State would intervene to require them to
accept voucher students if it sincerely wanted to help poor, minority Cleveland
students.
In short, if Ohio's Voucher Program provides incentives that are too low to induce
school districts adjacent to Cleveland to participate, or the adjacent school
districts are refusing to participate for malevolent reasons and the state refuses to
require them to participate, then one can only conclude that Ohio's Voucher
Program channels students and revenues into religious schools.
The Court also failed to offer an explanation as to why the parochial schools
accepted voucher students even though they are eligible to receive much less
funding than public schools."7 One answer could be that private schools have cost
structures and missions so different than those of public schools that they and the
public schools operate in two different markets. Indeed, public schools tend to
have higher costs than private schools, and religious private schools tend to have
lower costs than non-religious private schools. 7 1 As noted previously, religious
schools primarily pursue religious missions, so, they are not just in the business of
educating children, they are also in the business of saving souls. 172 Perhaps that is
why religious schools are willing to accept tuition that is lower than tuition
normally charged by non-religious schools.173
produce even though the price offered may be much higher than the monopolist's marginal costs. See
id. at 514-16.
168. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2496-97, 2497 n. 17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. See Samuelson & Nordhaus, supra n. 166, at 520-29 (discussing various government intervention
strategies to lessen the cost of monopoly); id. at 530-58 (discussing imperfect competition and antitrust
policy).
170. Under Ohio's Voucher plan, private schools may receive at maximum only their normal tuition
for accepting voucher students, whereas public schools receive the maximum voucher amount plus the
normal state per pupil contribution. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2497 n. 17 (Souter, J., dissenting); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(C)(1).
171. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2495, 2495 n. 15 (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing religious private
school costs versus non-religious private school costs); id. at 2497 n. 17 (discussing public school costs
and incentives).
172. See supra nn. 66-68 and accompanying text.
173. In a recent General Accounting Office study of vouchers in Cleveland and Milwaukee,
"[s]everal representatives from participating religious schools [in Cleveland] stated that their schools'
missions were to provide a private-school education to children in their communities, many of whom
come from low-income families. The schools purposely subsidize the cost of educating all enrolled
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Astoundingly, the Court supported its assertions that parents have a
financial disincentive to choose religious schools by observing that parents who
did not choose to participate in the Voucher Program had opportunities to send
their children free of charge to various types of public schools created and
114operated under other programs. Bizarrely, the Court also relied on this broader
array of options available to parents who did not seek vouchers to demonstrate
that the Voucher Program did not fail to provide Cleveland parents with genuine
secular educational opportunities. 75 The majority used this same technique to
claim that in actuality the percentage of children enrolled in religious schools as a
result of the Voucher Program was under twenty percent.
176
This broadening of the universe of choices to include the choices of persons
who did not participate in the challenged program was an unprincipled
modification of the Court's neutral selection/private choice test. Only in the
context of tax policy has the Court referred to options other than those available
to persons accepting the challenged benefit in determining the challenged
benefit's constitutionality, an approach that was not used in Witters and Zobrest.177
Virtually without boundaries, this technique could be used to uphold any program
that narrowly channels government benefits toward religious institutions simply
by noting all other theoretical options a person could pursue by not participating
in the challenged program. 1
78
students to achieve this mission." U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off. Rpt. to the Hon. Judd Gregg, School
Vouchers: Publicly Funded Programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee 25 (Aug. 2001).
174. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2470. The Majority rejected the assertion that ninety-six percent of
relevant children had not attended religious schools because the denominator did not include "(1) the
more than 1,900 Cleveland children enrolled in alternative community schools, (2) the more than
13,000 children enrolled in alternative magnet schools, and (3) the more than 1,400 children enrolled in
traditional public schools with tutorial assistance." Thus, the majority contended that "[i]ncluding
some or all of these children in the denominator of children enrolled in nontraditional schools during
the 1999-2000 school year drops the percentage enrolled in religious schools from 96% to under 20%."
Id. at 2471.
175. Id. at 2469.
176. Id. at 2470-71. This was accomplished by counting every child who enrolled in a magnet school,
community school or a traditional public school with tutorial assistance rather than only those students
participating in the Voucher Program.
177. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (focusing on the myriad of educational and training programs that could
be pursued in using the government aid); Zorbrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (noting that persons receiving a sign
language interpreter were free to attend a public, private non-religious and private religious school).
178. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2491 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter complains that this broad
inclusion of non-voucher options subverts the Court's neutrality principles. He states:
The illogic is patent. If regular, public schools (which can get no voucher payments)
"participate" in a voucher scheme with schools that can, and public expenditure is still
predominantly on public schools, then the majority's reasoning would find neutrality in a
scheme of vouchers available for private tuition in districts with no secular private schools at
all. "Neutrality" as the majority employs the term is, literally, verbal and nothing more.
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Souter also complained that the use of alternative options available
without using vouchers subverts the Court's insistence that the money wind up in religious coffers
through private choices that include many secular options. Id. at 2492-97. More specifically, Justice
Souter complained that:
If the choice of relevant alternatives is an open one, proponents of voucher aid will always
win, because they will always be able to find a "choice" somewhere that will show the bulk
of public spending to be secular. The choice enquiry will be diluted to the point that it can
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Finally, the Court rejected the notion that there should be any constitutional
significance attached to the fact that the Voucher Program funneled ninety-six
percent of voucher recipients into religious schools."' It did so by invoking
Mueller's holding that a program's constitutionality should not be judged on the
basis of what percentage of its beneficiaries selects a religious school option.' 8° In
part, the Court justified this approach by contending that the constitutionality of a
program ought not turn each year on the basis of fluctuating recipient
preferences. 8 '
The Court's fluctuating recipient preferences rationale would have been
palatable if Ohio's Voucher Program had offered voucher recipients a true public
school option, but it seems to be an insincere concern given the Court's contention
that voucher programs should not be declared unconstitutional in areas of the
country where the only non-public school options would be overwhelmingly
religious. 182 To bolster this contention, the Court, relying on Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest, held that Nyquist should not apply to voucher programs offering only a
choice between religious and non-religious private schools if the vouchers were
given directly to individual beneficiaries on the basis of religiously neutral
selection criteria. 18' But, all this misses the point, for in reality
[t]here is, in any case, no way to interpret the 96.6% of current voucher money
going to religious schools as reflecting a free and genuine choice by the families that
apply for vouchers. The 96.6% reflects, instead, the fact that too few nonreligious
school desks are available and few but religious schools can afford to accept more
than a handful of voucher students. 184
In light of Ohio's sordid history of desegregation conflicts, 85 public school
funding conflicts, 18 6 and financial difficulty in providing adequate educations in
high-poverty urban school districts, 87 one cannot help but feel that the Court
simply did not want to establish a precedent that would force states to make public
screen out nothing, and the result will always be determined by selecting the alternatives to
be treated as choices.
Id. at 2493.
179. Id. at 2470-71.
180. Id. at 2470.
181. Id. at 2471, 2471 n. 5.
182. Id. at 2470.
183. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472.
184. Id. at 2496 (Souter, J., dissenting). Not only did adjacent public school districts not participate
in the Voucher Program, but there were also few seats available for voucher students in nonreligious
private schools. Only 129 voucher students attended nonreligious schools, but since the total
enrollment of all such schools was 510, only a few hundred more students could attend nonreligious
students assuming voucher students could comprise their entire enrollments. Id. at 2495, 2495 n. 14.
Moreover, of the ten "participating" nonreligious private schools, "3 currently enroll no voucher
students. And of the remaining seven schools, one enrolls over half of the 129 [voucher] students that
attend these nonreligious schools, while only two others enroll more than 8 voucher students." Id. at
2495 n. 14. Finally, "'nonreligious schools with higher tuition (about $4,000) stated that they could
afford to accommodate just a few voucher students."' Id. at 2495 (citing U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off. Rpt. to
the Hon. Judd Gregg, supra n. 173, at 25).
185. See supra nn. 9, 13-17, 20-21 and accompanying text.
186. See supra nn. 9-12 and accompanying text.
187. See Doulin, supra n. 12.
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school districts accept voucher students from other public school districts in order
to sustain the constitutionality of their voucher programs. Such a requirement
would undoubtedly displease residents of suburban school districts that were the
beneficiaries of white and middle class flight from urban areas, 88 for their schools
would then have to undertake the difficult tasks of educating a larger number of
low-income minority students.189 This displeasure would be especially acute in
Ohio, where local property taxes play a large role in financing education in ways
that have caused educational opportunities to be very unequal among school
districts,19° and the voucher tuition payment would likely be much less than the
share of per pupil expenditures financed by the receiving district's local property
taxes.' 9'
V. EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY: ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ZELMAN MAJORITY
One of Zelman's great ironies was the conservative Justices' use of
educational inequality generally, and the plight of poor urban minority students
specifically, to leverage their Establishment Clause holdings. Despite finding that
only sixty percent of the voucher recipients are from low-income families,
92
thereby confirming that Ohio's Voucher Program only somewhat favors low-
income students, the majority boldly declared that the "program challenged here
was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to
poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system.' ' 93 The Court then
enhanced its argument that voucher programs should not be declared
unconstitutional simply because they do not provide many non-religious school
options by noting that such an outcome would disadvantage "inner-city Cleveland,
where Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed .. ."'9' In doing so,
the Court seemed to be insinuating that the Establishment Clause should be
interpreted in such a manner as to promote more educational equality.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas made this insinuation explicit.
Extolling vouchers as instruments of racial educational equality, 95  he
characterized voucher opponents as "wish[ing] to invoke the Establishment
Clause... to constrain a State's neutral efforts to provide greater educational
188. See supra n. 137 and accompanying text.
189. See e.g. Patrice M. Jones, Searching for Solutions; Reynoldsburg Blazes a New Trail in Quest for
Better Results, The Plain Dealer 1A (Aug. 24, 1995) (available in LEXIS, News Library, CLEVPD)
(documenting how a relatively affluent suburban school district's academic problems were increasing
as some 30,000 persons left urban Columbus, bringing their poverty and family problems with them).
In this regard, the United States General Accounting Office recently published a study showing that
Cleveland voucher students came from families that were somewhat better educated, poorer and more
likely to be headed by a single mother than Cleveland students who did not receive vouchers. U.S.
Gen. Acctg. Off. Rpt. to the Hon. Judd Gregg, supra n. 173, at 12-15.
190. See generally DeRolph v. St., 78 Ohio St. 3d 193 (1997); supra n. 11 and accompanying text.
191. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2496; supra n. 139 and accompanying text.
192. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
193. Id. at 2465.
194. Id. at 2469-70.
195. See id. at 2480, 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 38:329
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opportunity for underprivileged minority students., 19 6 This led him to suggest that
the Establishment Clause ought to be applied to states in a loose manner so that it
advances, rather than constrains, individual liberty.97 For Justice Thomas, such an
approach would free states to "pass laws that include or touch on religious matters
so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual
religious liberty interest.' '198 This would insulate states from Establishment Clause
challenges to their educational experiments, such as vouchers, "that allow[ ]
voluntary participation of private and religious schools in educating poor urban
children otherwise condemned to failing public schools." 199  Justice Thomas
expressed graphically his belief that such experiments are badly needed, for he
contended forcefully that:
[T]he promise of public school education has failed poor inner-city blacks. While in
theory providing education to everyone, the quality of public schools varies
significantly across districts. Just as blacks supported public education during
Reconstruction, many blacks and other minorities now support school choice
programs because they provide the greatest educational opportunities for their
children in struggling communities. 2°
VI. SCHOOL VOUCHERS:
THE CONSERVATIVES' SOLE CURE FOR EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY
What is so galling about the conservatives' crocodile tears for the plight of
poor minority students, and their insistence that vouchers are the tools of
liberation, is their complete lack of acknowledgment that conservative United
States Supreme Court majorities took away almost all other tools that could have
helped inner-city schools avoid the crises endured by the Cleveland School
District. In Milliken v. Bradley,201 the Court produced a five-to-four opinion
holding that federal judges could not desegregate an illegally segregated school
district through remedial orders requiring inter-district racial balancing, even
though the desegregating district would essentially be all African-American in
absence of an inter-district remedial order, unless the outlying districts themselves
had been involved in activity that facilitated the illegal segregation.2 2 The court
justified this outcome on four main grounds:
(1) "[D]esegregation ... does not require any particular racial balance in each
'school, grade or classroom."'' 20 3
196. Id. at 2480.
197. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2481.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2482.
200. Id. at 2483.
201. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
202. Id. at 745 (Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart, Blackman, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., majority
opinion).
203. Id. at 740-41 (citation omitted).
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(2) Permitting inter-district remedies would erode the nation's tradition of
supporting local control "thought essential both to the maintenance of
community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process,"
20 4
(3) Judges are not equipped to handle the complexity of running several school
districts simultaneously; 20 5 and
(4) Illegal desegregation must be remedied only in districts where students were
treated disparately on account of race.
206
This holding enabled white, middle-class families who had supported illegal
segregation in one district to escape participating in desegregation remedies by
moving from the desegregating district to another adjoining area just outside of
the district's boundaries.
The ability of federal judges to relieve the plight of poor minority students in
districts that were illegally desegregated was further reduced significantly in
Missouri v. Jenkins.207 In Jenkins, another five-to-four decision, the Court struck
down the federal district court's desegregative attractiveness/suburban
comparability remedy that required the upgrading of the desegregating district's
academic programs and facilities so that they would attract white, middle-class
208students living in other school districts. Relying on Milliken, the Court justified
its holding on the basis that remedies designed to attract students from other
districts are invalid inter-district remedies not tailored to eliminating the vestiges
of segregation within the desegregating district.209 The Court also asserted that
such remedies cannot be justified simply by the occurrence of "white flight., 210
Finally, the Court was concerned that the desegregative attractiveness/suburban
comparability doctrine imposes no practical boundaries in terms of money and
time on federal courts' remedial authority.211 In this regard, the Court noted that
"desegregative attractiveness had been used 'as the hook on which to hang
numerous policy choices about improving the quality of education in general
within the ... [district].' 2 2
The Jenkins decision also greatly hampered federal district courts' authority
to impose educational remedies in desegregation orders. Specifically, the Court
found it impermissible for federal district courts to make the achievement of
certain academic performance standards, such as national norms on standardized
204. Id. at 742-43.
205. Id. at 743-44.
206. Millikin, 418 U.S. at 746-47.
207. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
208. Id. at 91-100. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas in the majority opinion.
209. Id. at 91-96.
210. Id. at 96-98.
211. Id. at 98-100. In this regard, the Court noted that the federal district court had on many
occasions acceded to the school district's requests for expensive upgrades to its programs and facilities
"based on hopes that they will succeed in the desegregation effort." Id. at 98-99.
212. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 99 (quoting Mo. v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 76 (1990)).
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tests, the test of whether a school district has eliminated the educational vestiges
of segregation.213 Instead, the Court saddled district courts with the nearly
impossible task of tailoring their educational remedies so that they target only the
precise incremental effects of segregation on minority student achievement
without attempting to cure other problems caused by external factors that are not
the result of segregation . 14  Citing to expensive upgrades in facilities and
programs already made in the district, the Court advised the district court to
"consider that many goals of its quality education plan already have been
attained .. .,,2' This advice was ironic, given that conservatives tend to argue
that taxpayers should not have to make expensive investments in educational
inputs because they often do not lead to improvements in minority student
achievement.
216
Milliken and Jenkins concern the plight of children within school districts
that once were illegally segregated racially. Arguably, students who live in
districts that are systemically underfunded by state school funding systems that
produce large funding disparities among school districts are also discriminated
against. In fact, this was the basis of an Equal Protection suit against the way
Texas financed public education in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez."1 7
The five-to-four majority opinion in Rodriguez essentially rendered useless
the Equal Protection Clause as a source of remedying inadequate education in
systemically underfunded school districts. First, the Court found the plaintiff class
was "a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of
residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
districts. 2 18 Such a class, said the Court, did not have any "of the traditional
indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. 2 19
Second, and most importantly, the Court held that education is not a
fundamental right. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that "education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,2 2' because:
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today, it
213. Id. at 100-02.
214. Id. at 101-02.
215. Id. at 102.
216. Cf. David C. Berliner & Bruce J. Biddle, The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud, and the Attack
on America's Public Schools 70-74 (Perseus Books 1995); Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities:
Children in America's Schools 74, 82 (Harper Perennial 1991).
217. 411 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1973).
218. Id. at 28. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackman, and
Rehnquist in the majority opinion.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 29-39.
221. Id. at 29 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
2002]
31
Allison: School Vouchers: The Educational Silver Bullet, or an Ideological
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002
360 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:329
is a principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.
222
Nevertheless, the Court noted that it could not find something to be a
fundamental right simply because it was of great social or economic importance.223
It then rejected the "appellees' contention.., that education [should be declared
fundamental] because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and
liberties accorded protection under the Constitution., 224 The other rights referred
to were the important rights of expression and voting, 22' but after acknowledging
the importance of education to a person's ability to effectively exercise these
rights, the Court held that "we have never presumed to possess either the ability
or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice. 226 In sum, the Court concluded that the appellees'
argument:
provide[d] no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only
relative differences in spending levels are involved and where.., no charge fairly
could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process.227
Employing the rational basis test of Equal Protection, the Court then found that
Texas' system of funding education ,was rationally related to assuring a basic
education for every child in the state [while] permit[ting] and encouraging a large
measure of participation and control in each district's schools at the local level.2
28
So, through Milliken, Jenkins, and, most of all, Rodriguez, the conservatives
on the United States Supreme Court have stripped minority children of the ability
to get federal relief from obstinate state and local governments which have
discriminated against them, allowed many citizens responsible for the
discrimination to abandon them by fleeing to the suburbs, and provided them with
educations so poor that they do not even rise to the basic level. It is, therefore,
understandable why it was so difficult for parents in the Cleveland School District
to produce any better outcomes to their segregation, funding, and management
problems than those described in this paper. It is also understandable that
conservatives would now resort to undermining the tenants of the Establishment
Clause to provide their victims with the band-aid remedy of school vouchers.
222. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29-30 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
223. Id. at 30-34.
224. Id. at 35-37.
225. Id. at 35.
226. Id. at 35-36.
227. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 45-53.
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Measured against the comprehensive reform efforts embodied in Cleveland's
Vision 21 reform program, it seems a cruel joke for any serious person, much less
a United States Supreme Court Justice, to insist that a voucher program reaching
five percent of Cleveland's school-aged children is the magic bullet that will make
Cleveland an educational Mecca. For now, however, it is painfully obvious that
taxpayers outside of urban areas such as Cleveland are unwilling to pay for
comprehensive reforms and restructuring that involve expensive investments in
new teachers, additional classrooms, better equipment, new technology, better
training, and innovative new methods of helping students learn how to learn. As a
consequence, concerned minority parents will continue to clamor for some type of
voucher system that will at least provide an escape route for a few children.
Anxious to avoid united political movements demanding that urban schools have
the same tools used in wealthy suburban schools, conservative legislators, judges,
and taxpayers will be all too happy to provide vouchers as a means of pacifying
concerned minority parents who otherwise could have been the leaders of a real
reform movement.
Zelman permits this charade to continue by altering significantly the
conservatives' neutral selection/private choice rationale for relieving those who
would fund religious missions from the rigors of the Establishment Clause's
traditional effects test. Previously, this neutrality test at least required the Court
to determine whether (1) beneficiaries were selected through criteria that were in
fact neutral as to religion; and (2) the decisions of government beneficiaries to
redistribute their benefits to religious organizations were indeed privately
directed. In Zelman, however, the Court essentially held that facial neutrality
alone is enough to satisfy the Establishment Clause. Facial neutrality can be
satisfied simply by cleansing government benefits selection criteria of overt
religious classifications and distributing the benefits first to private individuals. By
exalting form over substance, Zelman's conservative majority has all but held that
only a secular purpose is needed to justify government providing religious
organizations with the same benefits it provides secular organizations.
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